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Yet change was in the air. The technical 
development of the “torpille” (basically 
a floating bomb) into the (self-propelled) 
“torpedo” posed a serious threat to 
vessels, including the most heavily 
armoured warships. Floating naval mines 
also constituted a considerable hazard to 
ships. Furthermore, these weapons could 
be deployed by relatively small ships. This 
meant the end of the period of maritime 
powerlessness. 
On the eve of WWI, Belgium had no navy 
but it did have a civil administration with 
maritime competences. The Marine Affairs 
Administration was not just responsible for 
the fishery protection vessels but also for 
the pilot boats and state packet boats of the 
Ostend-Dover line. By now, the Marine Affairs 
Administration had recognised the growing 
threat of war in Europe.
Still they did not consider the expansion 
of naval capacity, since the Second 
International Peace Conference held at The 
Hague in 1907 had extended the laws of 
war in an attempt to restrict the use of force 
as much as possible and ensure the safety 
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During the First World War, Germany 
reduced Belgium to beggary and inflicted 
serious damage to the latter at sea as 
well. Belgium lost 44 ships or – expressed 
in tonnage – 35.5 % of its merchant fleet. 
Nearly 300 sailors or 19% of Belgian seamen 
perished, a percentage which even exceeds 
that of soldiers killed at the front. These 
staggeringly high losses also had a great 
strategic impact, as they threatened the 
reinforcement of the forces at the Yser front 
and the capacity to transport sufficient food 
to the people in need in occupied Belgium. 
Did Belgium take action to counter the 
progressive destruction of its merchant fleet? 
Yes it did! Despite the need to reinforce the 
army at the river Yser as much as possible, 
the military commanders also sent troops 
into battle at sea, even though this was 
not easy, as the Belgian army did not have 
a maritime tradition nor any warships. For 
generations, Belgium had believed in a land 
strategy based on the defence of a ‘national 
stronghold’, in particular the fortified city 
of Antwerp. The core of the Belgian state 
had to survive an enemy invasion within this 
heavily defended belt of fortifications until 
the superpowers would oust the enemy. This 
did not mean the Belgian army would ‘stay 
out of the water’. After all, the Scheldt river 
split the Antwerp fortifications in two and the 
engineers had to construct pontoon bridges 
to allow the supply and movement of troops 
in case of a siege. It was therefore imperative 
for the Belgian army to control this broad 
river at any cost. The North Sea was quite 
different from the Scheldt river, however…
The Belgian government 
goes to sea
Traditionally, the Belgian shipping 
industry did not play a significant part in 
this strategy. Belgium was nevertheless 
obliged to pay some attention to its small 
surface area of territorial waters, as armed 
neutrality had been imposed on the country 
in 1839. This meant it had to defend its 
borders militarily in case of aggression. 
But for several decades it turned out to 
be unfeasible to deploy vessels that were 
capable of fending off attacks by intruding 
warships. The main armament was the naval 
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gun, and a small country like Belgium could 
not afford to keep up with the developments 
in artillery on ironclads.
Belgium did have fishery protection 
vessels to maintain authority at sea as 
well as to exercise certain police powers 
in accordance with the law of 6 January 
1884 and the agreements made with 
the neighbouring countries. These ships 
were charged with the duty of monitoring 
the fisheries activities as well as settling 
conflicts and giving assistance to fishermen 
in distress. One of these fishery protection 
vessels was Ville d’Anvers (launched in 
1886), a so-called “aviso”. These small but 
fast boats, equipped with sails as well as 
an engine, were also used to train both 
merchant marine and naval officers. One of 
them, Count de Borchgrave d’Altena, opted 
to continue his training as a naval officer. The 
Belgian government asked the French navy 
to enable him to gain practical experience 
on one of its warships. Although he was able 
to acquire experience in France for eleven 
and a half years, this did not result in an 
independent Belgian navy.
  In the build-up to the First World War, Belgium did not have a Navy nor any vessels that 
could be effectively deployed against intruding warships. It did have fishery protection vessels 
such as this ship, Ville d’Anvers, that could help settle conflicts at sea in addition to performing 
fishery-related duties (VLIZ Collection)
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other words, it could provoke an invasion. 
That something had to be done was beyond 
dispute.
Plans of De Borchgrave and 
De Broqueville nipped in the bud
Since 1909 Belgium had systematically 
expanded its military force. Catholic 
politician Charles de Broqueville played 
a crucial part in this. To get his arms 
programme accepted, which was highly 
controversial including in his own party, 
he combined the role of Prime Minister 
and Minister of War. He succeeded in 
considerably extending conscription and 
thus expanded the land forces significantly. 
But what about the naval forces? These did 
not come to the attention of the government 
until 1913, when the Prime Minister first saw 
the Pierrard report, three years after it had 
been drawn up. The threat of war had now 
increased even further. Could newly-built 
fishery protection vessels be converted 
into torpedo boats as a last resort? This 
was certainly technically feasible, as the 
French navy had already proved. In addition, 
two state packet boats could be equipped 
to serve as minelayers. This would allow 
Belgium to block the entrance to the coastal 
ports of Ostend and Zeebrugge. Such an act 
would send out a powerful message.
The Prime Minister definitely wanted 
to do something. On 22 May 1914 he 
dispatched a remarkable report to head of 
state King Albert I. Its contents were not 
very reassuring. Belgium had to face the 
possibility of an enemy landing at the coastal 
action. This intrusion of foreign warships 
was a real problem. In the summer of 1913, 
for instance, French submarines and torpedo 
boats entered the Belgian national waters 
several times. The departments concerned in 
Brussels communicated extensively on that 
matter. But Belgium did not have any armed 
ships yet, so all the authorities could do was 
protest. This created the risk that foreign 
powers could seize the opportunity to accuse 
Belgium of not being neutral in reality. In 
of civilian vessels (including the merchant 
fleet). However, the 1907 Hague Convention 
would not defuse the growing international 
crisis nor solve the problem of how to protect 
the Belgian coast.
 
Armed forces at sea?
Taking a stand 
against foreign warships
The 1907 Hague Convention made it 
legally possible to arm merchant ships 
and convert them into so-called “auxiliary 
cruisers”, on condition that the crew was 
uniformed and subject to military discipline. 
This meant that Belgium would be able to 
maintain its armed neutrality at sea at low 
cost and in the relatively short term. This 
was quite a relief for the government, which 
absolutely wanted to keep out of a war, 
and to do so it needed to uphold Belgian 
neutrality at all costs.
The Marine Affairs Administration did not 
stand by idly either. Engineer A. Pierrard, 
senior official at the Marine Affairs 
Administration, stated in a report dated  
25 October 1910 that the state packet boats 
could be armed with guns. He also proposed 
to replace the existing fishery protection 
vessels with ships that had military 
capabilities. The acquisition of ships and 
their conversion into minelayers could also 
be considered. Only through such means 
would Belgium be able to take a stand 
against the intrusion of foreign warships in 
its territorial waters and, if need be, take 
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  Charles de Broqueville (Wikipedia)
  This German drawing shows how naval mines were laid to block ports
(Die Wochenschau, 1915)
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ports. Moreover, Zeebrugge was important 
for ensuring the country’s supply in the long 
run, as the neutral Netherlands could close 
off the river Scheldt. Belgium therefore had 
to expand its defensive capabilities. In the 
meantime, De Borchgrave d’Altena had 
used his maritime knowledge to reinforce 
the fortifications around Antwerp, but he 
had more to offer. De Broqueville suggested 
to the King that a real navy should be 
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  Ostend packet boat La Flandre was moored in the harbour of Ostend when the Germans 
arrived on 15 October (14/18 op Zee, Belgische schepen en zeelui tijdens de Groote Oorlog, 
Freddy Philips)
  The pontoon bridge across the Scheldt in Antwerp in 1914 (Antwerp City Archives)
established which would be able to defend 
not just the Scheldt but also and particularly 
the North Sea coast. De Borchgrave could 
be put in command. Yet reality soon caught 
up with this proposal, launched at the 
end of May 1914. War was imminent. In 
early July, the senior officials of the Marine 
Affairs Administration were informed of the 
plan to take the best state-owned ships in 
Antwerp and the coastal ports to safety to 
protect them from being commandeered 
by warring navies. Additional fuel reserves 
were also built up. The Belgian army started 
to mobilise openly at the end of July. It was 
to no avail. The Germans presented an 
ultimatum on 2 August, which was resolutely 
rejected by the Belgian government. 
An enemy invasion 
from the east
Stronghold Antwerp
Now it was all hands on deck. Engineers 
started to build pontoon bridges across 
the Scheldt, which required vessels. The 
fortification’s garrison included pontonniers 
(pontoon bridge builders) but since 
April 1903 a compagnie de torpilleurs et 
d’artificiers (torpedo and explosives expert 
company) had also been available to defend 
the Scheldt with their artillery and mines. 
These torpedo and explosives experts had 
a few small boats with light guns at their 
disposal. When the German invasion began 
on 4 August 1914, the Belgian government 
ensured that part of the Marine Affairs 
Administration moved to the fortified city of 
Antwerp. They were still concerned about 
the coast as the maritime plans had not yet 
been implemented. De Borggraeve had been 
appointed commandant de la surveillance 
côtière (coastal surveillance commander), 
but he did not have any means at his 
disposal, so Belgium continued to depend on 
foreign support. This became clear when the 
government enlisted the help of the British 
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enemy merchantmen and fishing vessels. 
From then on, the battle against U-boats was 
an absolute priority for the Allies. Belgium 
could not stay behind, and the Marine Affairs 
Administration formally established the 
Dépôt des Equipages (Crew Depot) in early 
May 1917.
particularly well protected. The remaining 16 
ships were more or less free but they risked 
being commandeered, as all warring nations 
were short of transport capacity. Mr Pierrard 
pointed out that many of these remaining 
vessels were too small and too weak to cross 
the Atlantic. Moreover, he was very 
concerned about the supply of food to the 
population in occupied Belgium. New steps 
in the militarisation of the fleet were not to 
jeopardise this.
In early 1917 he thought there were too 
few Belgian ships to carry much-needed 
food supplies to the German-occupied zone. 
He feared this lack of transport capacity 
would even be felt after the war. This is 
why Mr Pierrard sounded the alarm in a 
memorandum to Minister of Transport Paul 
Segers on 4 February 1917. He found the 
scarcity of available tonnage alarming and 
was convinced that more losses would 
follow due to the aggression of German 
U-boats. He hoped that arming merchant 
ships would help solve this problem, as 
American merchantmen were also being 
armed with guns, both on the bow and on 
the afterdeck. His disturbing statements 
are hardly surprising. On 1 February 1917 
Germany had announced it would engage 
in unrestricted submarine warfare against 
to defend the Ostend-Dover line after one 
of the packet boats noticed a “torpille” and 
was forced to turn around on 6 August. Such 
explosives could also enter the Scheldt river, 
carried by the incoming tide. The British 
government replied that their admiralty could 
not promise to send a warship to deactivate 
“torpilles”.
The German invasion force did not attack 
the fortified city of Antwerp until several 
weeks after the invasion. When the German 
artillery systematically eliminated the belt 
of fortifications in late September, Antwerp 
soon turned out to be indefensible. On 6 
October the King decided to send the bulk of 
the army to the coast. The pontoon bridges 
across the Scheldt had more than proved 
their usefulness by now. Now they had to be 
destroyed.
The Belgian retreat
The objective was to create a base around 
the ports of Ostend and Zeebrugge so that 
the army could regroup. This suddenly 
highlighted the strategic value of the Belgian 
coastal ports. But the German pressure 
was too great. The Belgian army therefore 
marched on towards the French border, but 
they failed to destroy the harbour facilities. 
Eventually, the greater part of the Belgian 
coast fell into the hands of the enemy. The 
German advance was only halted in the Yser 
plain in the second half of October, partly 
thanks to the rising water.
The Belgian government retreated to the 
French coastal city of Le Havre. They were 
joined by a few senior officials from the 
Marine Affairs Administration, including  
A. Pierrard. They had a lot of work to do 
as the Belgian merchant fleet had for the 
most part escaped from the Germans and 
numerous fishing vessels were moored in 
French, Dutch or British ports. As a result, 
Belgium still had the means to contribute to 
the war effort against the invading force at 
sea. However, Belgium waited a long time 
before it really began to deploy merchant 
and fishing ships in the war. The decree-
law of 2 February 1916 finally regulated the 
commandeering of ships.
In the meantime, the German navy had 
bared its teeth. On 12 December 1916, 
Mr Pierrard informed the minister that 16 
Belgian ships had been sunk. It goes without 
saying that the protection of the remaining 
freighters was of great importance. He asked 
whether the Belgian army could place guns 
and gunners on the ships so that they could 
defend the vessels against German attackers.
Armed ships
A total of 66 steamboats with a collective 
tonnage of 180,640 tonnes were still sailing 
under Belgian flag at that time. Of these 
ships, 25 were commandeered by the state 
and 25 other vessels exclusively carried out 
transports to supply food to the occupied 
part of Belgium. These ships had to be 
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  A torpedo barely misses an enemy ship (Die Wochenschau, 1915)
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often insufficiently trained. The military 
therefore had to set their own house in order 
first, he thought. Mr Pierrard added that the 
old fishery protection vessel Ville d’Anvers 
would soon be transferred to Mr Cornellie 
and was available for training purposes in 
Calais. The ship had to make it possible 
to train ship mechanics and gunners in 
realistic circumstances at sea. Mr Cornellie 
knew Ville d’Anvers very well since he had 
served as an officer on the ship. However, 
the Marine Affairs Administration continued 
to demand that the captain and the chief 
mechanic would be answerable to the civilian 
administration.
The Marine Affairs Administration wished 
to reduce the influence of the military as 
they feared that the ships would otherwise 
also be deployed for the Allied war effort. 
This could provoke a German reaction 
that would threaten the supply of food to 
occupied Belgium. Mr Pierrard therefore 
wanted the Marine Affairs Administration 
to keep in charge of the deployment of 
Belgian vessels. In his opinion, the Ministry 
of War was in the wrong position to act in 
this delicate matter. This conflict no doubt 
delayed the development of naval power. 
Mr Bultinck, a colleague of Mr Pierrard at 
the Marine Affairs Administration in London, 
felt differently, however. He was in favour of 
close cooperation, even with the navies of 
the Allies.
The Dépôt des Equipages: a thorn 
in the side of the Marine Affairs 
Administration
The decision had in fact already been 
taken in January, when the competent 
ministers aimed at the formation of a war 
fleet in addition to the civilian Marine Affairs 
Administration. This Dépôt was actually a 
training centre and hub for sailors and had 
to make it possible to replace crew members 
of neutral nationality with Belgians, since 
neutral seamen pulled out en masse now 
that they risked their lives too. On 3 May 
1917, the cabinet of the Minister of War 
informed the General Headquarters that the 
Dépôt would also be used for the military 
training of sailors and gunners who operated 
the artillery pieces mounted on the ships. 
The Dépôt was established at Grand Fort 
Philippe near the small French port of 
Gravelines. In addition to a staff and training 
facilities there were two companies of sailors 
and one platoon of naval gunners. 
Cooperation between the military and 
the Marine Affairs Administration did not go 
smoothly, however. Their objectives were too 
far apart. The Marine Affairs Administration 
wanted to deploy as much cargo ships as 
possible while the Ministry of War wanted to 
create naval capacity to protect those cargo 
ships. This required vessels to be berthed at 
the quayside for a while so that they could 
be equipped with artillery pieces. The Marine 
Affairs Administration found this hard to 
accept. Mr Cornellie and another officer paid 
a visit to Mr Pierrard on 26 October 1917. Mr 
Cornellie had been captain of a packet boat 
but he was also a reserve officer and now 
in military service. Both officers informed 
Mr Pierrard that the command of the Dépôt 
would be fully transferred to the military. 
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Mr Pierrard explained the Marine Affairs 
Administration’s point of view: the Dépôt 
had to be a reservoir of able seamen and 
only in the second place a training centre for 
military who would fight in the war. In his 
view, the military’s only task was to provide 
solid training to gunners and nothing more. 
He added that recent experience had taught 
that the gunners aboard Belgian ships were 
   The production of torpedoes in Germany (Marinekorps Flandern, De Vlaamse 
kust en het hinterland tijdens de eerste Wereldoorlog, Johan Ryheul)
   A typical 75 mm gun mounted on a pedestal from 1916. Many merchant ships were 
equipped with this type of gun (14/18 op Zee, Belgische schepen en zeelui tijdens de grote 
oorlog, Freddy Philips)
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make it possible to solve this problem? This 
is where Belgian engineer and officer Van 
Deuren came in. 
A mortar against U-boats?
Pierre Van Deuren had worked on the 
development of a simple mortar for a 
long time. It had to provide the front-line 
infantry with the necessary power to destroy 
opposing German positions. He also saw 
possibilities in the war at sea. Experience 
had taught that a German U-boat could do 
serious damage with her gun if she was able 
to approach within one kilometre. This was 
exactly the distance at which the Van Deuren 
mortar could be fired efficiently.
But how was this done? The high-arcing 
ballistic trajectory of the finned mortar 
round made a direct hit on the submarine 
virtually impossible. But this was largely 
compensated by the fact that the mortar 
bomb contained a much bigger explosive 
charge than the shell of a direct-fire gun. Van 
Deuren devised an explosive charge of 30 
to 50 kg. An impact within 50 to 100 metres 
from the submarine was sufficient to give the 
the course. After all, the training course 
only took four days. The Cornellie report on 
training dated 23 February 1918 especially 
highlighted the usefulness of practical 
demonstrations at sea. This involved a 
U-boat attack and target practice with a naval 
gun. There were only three gunners on board 
so the civilian crew also had to help operate 
the gun and keep watch. Every participant in 
the course could fire six rounds at a moving 
target at sea in practice. Civilian naval 
officers were taught how to operate the gun 
as well. They even went aboard a submarine. 
The training course was short yet intensive 
and had a very practical focus. 
It also made clear that many people 
aboard the Belgian ships were insufficiently 
familiar with naval guns. So this training 
course came not a moment too soon. Yet 
the deployment of naval guns also had 
disadvantages. Direct-fire artillery pieces 
could only be used against surface-running 
German submarines that intended to use 
their gun. This was indeed the usual strategy 
if no warships were nearby. But what if the 
attack came from a submerged submarine 
that intended to use torpedoes? Did the 
latest developments in the field of artillery 
Gunners on board
Mr Bultinck had seen a report (dated 19 
November) by M.C. Simon, former captain 
of the port of Bruges. In this report, Mr 
Simon asked whether the virtually inexistent 
training of captains was the cause of the 
heavy losses inflicted on the Belgian 
merchant fleet. British experience had 
shown that well-trained captains had a 95% 
chance of escaping from an approaching 
German U-boat. He did not beat around the 
bush and recommended the British training 
course to the Union of Belgian Shipowners, 
established in London. He also found an 
audience on the Continent. In December the 
Ministry of War decided to have eight officers 
of the Dépôt des Equipages take the British 
course. Only two Belgian captains had been 
given this opportunity in the past, and those 
two had convinced Mr Bultinck. Now the 
Ministry of War agreed.
Mr Pierrard came round, as the gunners 
came under the command of the captain. The 
training course would improve the command 
and thus increase the captain’s authority. He 
also approved of Bultinck’s efforts to have 
the captains of the state packet boats take 
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   Torpedoes carried a very heavy explosive charge but could be launched by relatively small vessels. This is how German propaganda illustrated 
the operations of the Flanders Flotilla in the Channel (Die Wochenschau, 1915)
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enemy a good shaking. The U-boat would 
certainly be hindered in her attack operation, 
especially if the finned bombs came down 
on the sea surface in quick succession. If a 
submarine was bombarded in this manner, 
there was a good chance that the attack 
would be aborted.
In addition, firing a mortar from a boat 
was much easier than firing a gun. As the 
launch tube was always set at 45 degrees, 
less expertise and training were required 
to operate it. Van Deuren claimed he would 
be able to arm a thousand ships in three 
months. But his mortar had to be tested 
first. This took place in close collaboration 
with the French navy in the summer of 
1917. A mortar was fired from a ship at a 
demarcated area of 75 metres by 25 metres, 
700 metres away on a beach east of Calais 
to see where the bombs would fall. Rounds 
were fired both in calm and turbulent 
conditions to determine the precision of the 
shots. Everything worked properly during 
the tests. The precision of the mortar at sea 
was comparable to that on land, so they 
were on the right track. During a test in 
turbulent conditions the operators achieved 
very reasonable results in terms of accuracy, 
even though the boat was rolling a lot. 
The assessment committee also had a 47 
mm naval gun tested. On comparison, the 
mortar turned out to perform much better. 
Moreover, the finned bombs made it possible 
to hit submerged U-boats from the moment 
their periscope was detected. This was not 
feasible with a regular naval gun.
•  Lists of ships sunk and crew members killed can be 
found in Onze helden, gestorven voor het vaderland, 
België’s epische strijd van 1914 tot 1918, Brussels 1922, 
p. 226 and 229-230.
•  The first attempted historiography of the development 
of military power at sea is: Louis Leconte, Les ancêtres 
de notre Force navale, 1952.
In the meantime, a lot of records have become 
accessible, partly to be found in the files transferred by 
the army’s historical service to the documentation centre 
of the Royal Army and Military History Museum. Another 
part is located in the Belgian military archives, which were 
first confiscated by the German army and then by the Red 
Army, and can now also be studied in the Royal Army and 
Military History Museum.
The archives of the Marine Affairs Administration 
located in the Belgian General State Archives are also 
very important, especially files 8001, 8002, 8010, 8008, 
8033-8044.
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Too late, the war was over
It took too long for the mortar to become 
operational on board the Belgian merchant 
fleet. In the meantime, the tide had turned 
on the western front. The summer of 1918 
heralded the decline of Germany’s military 
might. An armistice was signed on 11 
November. The war was over, but it was 
not until 11 April 1919 that a memorandum 
followed which allowed the gunners to leave 
the merchant fleet, mainly because the 
freighters were no longer commandeered. In 
addition, the peace negotiations in Versailles 
progressed well and it was clear that the 
German navy no longer posed a threat. Now 
that all hostilities had ceased, what was to 
be done with the built up military capacity at 
sea? 
Belgium had lost a large part of its 
merchant fleet, but at least the development 
of a Belgian navy had started. Was Belgium 
able and willing to expand its naval power 
in the coming peacetime as well? It certainly 
was within the bounds of possibility, if 
only because German warships were made 
available after 11 November 1918. But the 
Belgian authorities did not wish to invest 
in this after an international détente set in 
1925. The option of a navy was discarded 
again, yet this would be only temporary, as 
history has shown.
  Thanks to the large stabiliser fins, these mortar rounds held a steady course over their trajectory (Luc Vandeweyer)
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